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A Constitutional Counterpunch to
Georgia's Anti-SLAPP Statute
by Nick Phillips*
and Ryan Pumpian"
A "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation"-commonly
referred to as a "SLAPP-is a lawsuit intended to chill free speech and
healthy public debate and to otherwise intimidate people from speaking
out on issues of public concern.' True SLAPP suits strike at the heart of
the United States and Georgia Constitutions, specifically the rights to
free speech and to petition the government enshrined therein. 2 In recent
years, state legislatures, including the Georgia General Assembly, have
attempted to ward off SLAPP suits through legislation-commonly
referred to as "anti-SLAPP" statutes-aimed at the early dismissal of
3
SLAPPs and the award of attorney's fees and costs to the SLAPP target.

*Civil Litigator in the firm of Bloom Parham, LLC, in Atlanta, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., cum laude, 2007); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2012).
-Civil Litigator in the firm of Bloom Parham, LLC, in Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Florida (B.A., 1994); The George Washington University Law School (J.D., cum laude,
1998).
1. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against PublicParticipation,7 PACE
ENvTL. L. REv. 3, 4 (1989) ("We call the suits 'SLAPPs,' for Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation. We have found that this accurately captures both their causation and
their consequences.").
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5 ("Every person
may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the
abuse of that liberty."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 9 ("The people have the right to assemble
peaceably for their common good and to apply by petition or remonstrance to those vested
with the powers of government for redress of grievances.").
3. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://antislapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Jan 23, 2018) (noting various
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Anti-SLAPP statutes are, arguably, well-intended. The expressed aim
of anti-SLAPP statutes is to promote the right to free speech and to
petition-and some would argue, democracy as we know it-by
attempting to prevent or discourage SLAPP suits and provide for their
quick dismissal if filed. 4 Yet, in attempting to promote the SLAPP
target's constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government, anti-SLAPP statutes often infringe on the plaintiffs
constitutional rights, including the right to a jury, due process, equal
protection, and ironically, the right to petition.5 Georgia's anti-SLAPP
statute is no exception.
This Article explores the constitutionality of section 9-11-11.16 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), Georgia's anti-SLAPP
statute. Part I offers a brief historical perspective on SLAPP suits and
the different judicial and legislative remedies to SLAPPs used or
suggested by commentators. Part II discusses the framework, procedure,
and applicability of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute. Part III discusses the
constitutional infirmities of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding
that the statute is likely unconstitutional. Finally, Part IV proposes
alternatives to Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute that both better promote
the aims of the statute and do not run afoul of the United States or
Georgia Constitutions.

state anti-SLAPP statutes); see, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2017) (Georgia's anti-SIAPP
statute).
4. For example, the Georgia statute states:
The General Assembly of Georgia finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to encourage participation by the citizens of Georgia in matters of public
significance and public interest through the exercise of their constitutional
rights of petition and freedom of speech. The General Assembly of Georgia
further finds and declares that the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
petition and freedom of speech should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process. To accomplish the declarations provided for under this subsection, this
Code section shall be construed broadly.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(a) (2017).
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 875 (Wash. 2015) (holding Washington's antiSLAPP statute violated state constitutional right to jury trial and right to petition); Op. of
the Justices, 641 A.2d 1012, 1014-15 (N.H. 1994) (holding New Hampshire's proposed antiSLAPP statute would violate state constitutional right to jury trial); Mobile Diagnostic
Imaging, Inc. v. Hooten, 889 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Minn. App. 2016) (holding Minnesota's antiSLAPP statute violated state constitutional right to jury trial).
6. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2017).

2018]

ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE

409

I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. An Overview of SLAPP Suits
In the classic SLAPP case, a well-funded corporation alleges
defamation or other tortious conduct against detractors and critics who
speak out against the company or a particular project or policy of the
company. 7 SLAPP suits commonly arise in connection with real estate
development. For example, if disgruntled neighboring landowners
protest the development (or redevelopment) of property, the developer
might sue the protestors for defamation or tortious interference with
contract or business relations.8 Through intimidation and the threat of
mounting legal expenses, the real estate developer seeks to muzzle its
critics by stopping them from speaking out or punishing them for doing
so.9 A New York court summarized the classic SLAPP suit as follows:
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena
where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense.
The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation that
can be churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and the closer
the SLAPP filer moves to success. The purpose of such gamesmanship
ranges from simple retribution for past activism to discouraging future
activism. Needless to say, an ultimate disposition in favor of the target
often amounts merely to a pyrrhic victory. Those who lack the financial
resources and emotional stamina to play out the "game" face the
difficult choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being
brought to their knees to settle. T[he] ripple effect of such suits in our
society is enormous. Persons who have been outspoken on issues of
public importance targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such
suits will often choose in the future to stay silent. Short of a gun to the

7. See Pring, supranote 1, at 5-9.
8. See id. at 13-14 (noting examples of real estate development-related SLAPPs);
Jessica Block, Civil Procedure-SpecialMotion to Dismiss-Anti-SLAPP Statute, 91 MASS.
L. REV. 97, 98 (2008) (explaining that the "typical mischief' in SLAPP cases historically has
been in the real estate development context); Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M. Romero,
Resolving Land- Use Disputes by Intimidation:SLAPP Suits in New Mexico, 32 N.M. L. REV.
217, 218 (2002) ("The typical SLAPP suit involves citizens opposed to a particular real
estate development.") (quoting Dixon v. Superior Ct., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994)); see, e.g., Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 596, 547 S.E. 2d 311, 312 (2001)
(regarding "a dispute between a landowner seeking to rezone a parcel of land for
development and concerned residents of the affected neighborhood"); Providence Constr.
Co. v. Bauer, 229 Ga. App. 679, 679, 494 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1997) ("The developer sought to
enjoin the residents from actively opposing its efforts to rezone a parcel of property
adjoining the subdivision.").
9. Pring, supranote 1, at 5-6.
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head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be
imagined. 10
In short, "SLAPPs send a clear message: that there is a 'price' for
speaking out politically. The price is a multimillion-dollar lawsuit and
the expenses, lost resources, and emotional stress such litigation
brings.""
Since SLAPP suits were first recognized as a growing trend in the late
1980s, 12 the question has been how to prevent them.' 3
Solutions suggested by academic and professional observers fall
generally into four categories: (1) those which aim at deterring SLAPP
suits from being filed at all; (2) those which aim at early identification
of targets and dismissal of SLAPP suits already filed; (3) those which
aim at indemnification, such as awards of attorney fees and
counterclaims for compensatory or punitive damages; and (4) those
which aim at helping targets in the conduct of their defense.
Within each of these four categories remedies fall into two groups: (1)
judicialsolutions, which proceed from existing actions and procedures,
and (2) statutory solutions, which involve a legislative response
designed specifically to meet the SLAPP problem.14

B. JudicialRemedies to SLAPP Suits
George Pring, who coined the term "SLAPP,"15 suggested early on that
the best solution to SLAPPs is judicial rather than legislative: "The best
of these solutions lie with our courts-the very institution designed to
protect individual liberties and political rights, yet, ironically, the very
institution being manipulated to produce the 'chilling effect' of
SLAPPs."16 There are two basic judicial approaches: (1) judicially-crafted
procedures providing for early dismissal of SLAPPs, and (2)
counterclaims filed by SLAPP targets seeking damages and attorney's
10. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
11. Pring, supra note 1, at 6.
12. Id. at 3-4 ("What is this new (and, we believe, growing) litigation phenomenon?
The civil lawsuits we are studying at the University of Denver's Political Litigation Project
are all filed against non-governmental individuals and groups for having communicated
their views to a government body or official on an issue of some public interest.").
13. See id. at 15-21.

14. Jerome I. Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection:Unburdeningthe Right of Petition
in California, 32 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 965, 984 (1999) (emphasis added) (noting various
solutions to SLAPP suits); Pring, supra note 1, at 15-21.
15. See Pring, supra note 1, at 4; see also Block, supra note 8, at 97 n.5 ("The phrase
was coined by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan.").
16. Pring, supra note 1, at 21.
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fees for the wrongful lawsuit, sometimes called "SLAPP-Backs." 17 Both
are discussed below.

1. Judicially-Crafted Procedures for Early Dismissal
Several states rely on rules and procedures created by the courts for
the early identification and dismissal of SLAPPs. 18

a. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Relying on the First Amendment right to petition, the Supreme Court
of the United States has long protected citizens against SLAPPs-well
before the term SLAPP was coined. This protection, commonly known as
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, arose from two Supreme Court opinions
issued in the 1960s in the antitrust context, Eastern RailroadPresident's
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.19 and United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington.20 The result of those two cases was an express
recognition that conduct intended to influence government action was
absolutely privileged, and therefore, could not be the basis for liability
under the antitrust laws, even if it negatively affected the plaintiff or
competition generally. 21 That protection was subsequently extended to
judicial activity 22 and to areas of the law beyond antitrust. 23 The NoerrPennington doctrine has been used for decades to enable targets of
SLAPPs to end the case at the motion to dismiss stage.

b. Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to
Address SLAPPs at the Motion to Dismiss Stage
In Webb v. Fury,24 the Supreme Court of West Virginia applied the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and reversed the trial court's refusal to

17. Braun, supranote 14, at 985-94; Pring, supranote 1, at 17-21.
18. See PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, supranote 3; see also Kourtney Harrison & Scott
Ellis Ferrin, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participationin EducationalSettings: Are
Anti-SLAPP's Provisions Protecting the Right Parties, 306 ED. L. REP. 1, 8 (2014)
(discussing states without anti-SLAPP statutes).
19. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
20. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
21. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 36 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on othergrounds, Harris
v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993).
22. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973).
23. See Rowe & Romero, supra note 8, at 224-25 (discussing the broad application of
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine outside of antitrust cases); see, e.g., Zeller v. Consolini, 758
A.2d 376, 382 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (applying the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to zoning
case); Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 36-37 (discussing the application of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine in various contexts).
24. 282 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1981).
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dismiss a lawsuit based on privileged petitioning activity. 25 In Webb, an
individual and his non-profit corporation (the defendants) filed an
administrative complaint with the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) and
requested an evidentiary hearing with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), asserting that DLM Coal Corporation (DLM) violated the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Clean
Water Act. 26 The nonprofit defendant also issued a newsletter suggesting
that DLM was not responsibly mining coal. 27 DLM responded by filing a

lawsuit against the defendants alleging that the defendants defamed
DLM through their communications with the EPA and OSM, as well as
through the newsletter published by the nonprofit. 28 DLM claimed that
the defendants' legal actions and newsletter were false and defamatory. 29
The defendants moved to dismiss DLM's lawsuit because their
communications were constitutionally privileged. 30 They argued that
"these activities are absolutely privileged petitioning activities under the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, for that
reason, [DLM] may not maintain an action for damages against them." 31

The Circuit Court of Upshur County denied the motion to dismiss. 32
On appeal, the Supreme Court of West Virginia, relying on the NoerrPennington doctrine, explained that "[t]he right to petition for redress of
grievances is among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the
Bill of Rights." 33 Accordingly, "[i]f it appears that [defendants'] conduct
falls within the class of absolutely privileged petitioning activity, the
mere pendency of the action will threaten the [defendants'] free exercise
of their right to petition the government and the denial of the motion to
dismiss by the circuit court will constitute error." 34 The court held that

the defendants' communications to the EPA and OSM were "classic
examples of absolutely privileged petitioning activity."35 Likewise, the
newsletter published by the non-profit defendant was also protected
petitioning activity because "the right to petition includes, among other
things, activity designed to influence public sentiment concerning the
25. Id. at 43.

§§

26. Id. at 31; see also Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
1201-1328 (2017); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2017).
27. Webb, 282 S.E.2d at 32-33.
28. Id. at 31.
29. Id. at 31-33.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id. at 33.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 34 (quoting Stern v. U.S. Gypsum Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342 (7th Cir. 1977)).

34. Id.
35. Id. at 37.
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passage and enforcement of laws as well as appeals for redress made
directly to the government." 36 The court concluded that "[A] publicity
campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the category
of political activity." 37

In holding that DLM's lawsuit should have been dismissed, the court
reasoned:
[W]e shudder to think of the chill our ruling would have on the exercise
of the freedom of speech and the right to petition were we to allow this
lawsuit to proceed. The cost to society in terms of the threat to our
liberty and freedom is beyond calculation. This cost would be especially
high were we to prohibit the free exchange of ideas on such pressing
social matters as surface mining. Surface mining, and energy
development generally, are matters of great public concern.
Competing social and economic interests are at stake. To prohibit
robust debate on these questions would deprive society of the benefit
of its collective thinking and, in the process, destroy the free exchange
of ideas which is the adhesive of our democracy. Our democratic
system is designed to do the will of the people, and when the people
cannot express their will, the system fails. It is exactly this type of
debate which our federal and state constitutions protect; debate
intended to increase our knowledge, to illustrate our differences, and
to harmonize those differences in order to form a more perfect union.
We see this dispute between the parties as a vigorous exchange of
ideas which is more properly within the political arena than in the
courthouse. To hold otherwise would be to isolate ourselves in
ignorance and to deprive society of the collective genius upon which
our civilization depends. This we must never allow.38

Similarly, in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court
of Jefferson County (POME),3 9 the Supreme Court of Colorado relied on
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to dismiss a SLAPP suit.40 Going a step
further than the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Webb, the Colorado
high court set forth a standard for trial courts for analyzing (and
dismissing) SLAPP suits at the motion to dismiss stage. 41
In POME, a developer sought to rezone 507 acres of land in Jefferson
County, Colorado, for the purpose of constructing 465 residential units,
retail and office space, a conference center, recreational facilities, an

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 42.
Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140-41).
Id. at 43-44.
677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
Id. at 1369.

41. See id.
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early education center, and 1700 parking spaces. The Jefferson County
Board of County Commissioners (the Board) approved the application.
Thereafter, an environmental protection group, Protect Our Mountain
Environment, Inc., and several individuals (collectively referred to as
POME) sued the Board and the developer seeking to overturn the Board's
decision. The Jefferson County District Court and Colorado Court of
Appeals ruled against POME.42

Following POME's unsuccessful lawsuit, the developer sued POME
and its legal counsel, alleging that POME abused the legal process by
filing and pursuing a lawsuit against the Board and the developer that
POME knew was without legal justification. The developer also alleged
that POME's legal counsel engaged in a civil conspiracy to bring
groundless claims against the developer. The developer asserted that the
actions of POME and its legal counsel caused the developer economic
harm to the tune of $10 million in compensatory damages and $30 million
in exemplary damages. 43
POME filed a motion to dismiss the developer's lawsuit on the grounds
that POME's initial action was protected petitioning activity under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 4 Relying on the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Supreme Court of Colorado set forth a
standard by which motions to dismiss based on the First Amendment
right to petition should be assessed:
That standard requires that when, as here, a plaintiff sues another for
alleged misuse or abuse of the administrative or judicial processes of
government, and the defendant files a motion to dismiss by reason of
the constitutional right to petition, the plaintiff must make a sufficient
showing to permit the court to reasonably conclude that the
defendant's petitioning activities were not immunized from liability
under the First Amendment because: (1) the defendant's
administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual
support, or, if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law for
their assertion; and (2) the primary purpose of the defendant's
petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some
other improper objective; and (3) the defendant's petitioning activity
45
had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.
The court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of
POME's motion to dismiss in light of the appropriate standard. 46
42. Id. at 1362-64.
43. Id. at 1364.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 1369.
46. Idat 1370.
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The decisions in Webb and POME demonstrate how courts can provide
judicial protection to SLAPP targets by dismissing SLAPP suits early in
the litigation. In addition to this judicial protection, the SLAPP target
can also file counterclaims against a SLAPP to recover damages, fees,
and costs arising from the SLAPP suit: namely, "SLAPP-Back."
2. The "SLAPP-Back" Lawsuit
"The most effective long-range tool for discouraging filings at the
outset appears to be the 'SLAPP-Back,' a subsequent counterclaim or
countersuit for damages by the target against the filer." 47 "The clearest

resort for a party aggrieved by a groundless lawsuit is an action for
malicious prosecution. This is a long-established remedy available in
48
every state."

In Georgia, for example,
[a]ny person who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation,
or procurement of civil proceedings against another shall be liable for
abusive litigation if such person acts:
(1) With malice; and
(2) Without substantial justification. 49
'Malice' means acting with ill will or for a wrongful purpose .

.

. or

us[ing] process for a purpose other than that of securing the proper
adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based.50
'Without substantial justification' . . . means ...
(A) Frivolous;
(B) Groundless in fact or in law; or

47. Pring, supra note 1, at 4 n.2, 19 n.56 (collecting articles discussing "SLAPP-Back"
counterclaims).
48. Braun, supra note 14, at 990 (discussing SLAPP-backs and their drawbacks as a
remedy to SLAPP suits).
49. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81 (2017); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hall, 144 B.R. 568, 578
(S.D. Ga. 1992) ("Today, both the actions for malicious use and abuse of process have been
merged into Georgia's abusive litigation tort"); see also O.C.G.A. § 51-7-85 (2017) ("On and
after April 3, 1989, no claim other than as provided in this article or in Code Section 9-15-14
shall be allowed, whether statutory or common law, for the torts of malicious use of civil
proceedings, malicious abuse of civil process, nor abusive litigation, provided that claims
filed prior to such date shall not be affected. This article is the exclusive remedy for abusive
litigation.").
50. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80(5) (2017).
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(C) Vexatious.51

Georgia's abusive litigation statute has been used successfully by
SLAPP targets in fighting back against the SLAPP filer.52
In addition to Georgia's abusive litigation statute, Georgia has two
statutes under which a party subject to frivolous litigation may seek
attorney's fees and costs. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14,53 a party is entitled
to attorney's fees and litigation expenses when another party asserts a
claim "with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any
justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed
that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other position." 54
SLAPP targets have also used this statute successfully.5 5
Section 13-6-1156 of the O.C.G.A. also provides for an award of
attorney's fees and expenses against a defendant who has acted in bad
faith, been stubbornly litigious, or caused unnecessary trouble and
expense.5 7 However, only plaintiffs can assert this statute, so the value
to a SLAPP target may be limited.5 8
All of these statutory provisions are potential tools that may be used
by a SLAPP target to SLAPP-back against a SLAPP suit.59
C. Legislative Remedies to SLAPP Suits
One of the most common approaches to remedy SLAPP suits is the
enactment of anti-SLAPP statutes. "These statutes provide features that
are intended to protect public participants and activists from claims
based on their petitioning activities, in order to at least minimize the cost
of defending against abusive discovery and other legal process during
such frivolous suits."6 0 Anti-SLAPP statutes vary from state to state but

generally provide for prompt dismissal of the SLAPP suit and the award
of attorney's fees and costs to the successful defendant seeking

51. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80(7) (2017).
52. See Nairon v. Land, 242 Ga. App. 259, 260, 529 S.E.2d 390, 392 (2000) (noting that
SLAPP target sued real estate developer under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 for abusive litigation as
a result of SLAPP suit filed by the developer; developer settled claims made by SLAPP
target under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81).
53. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2017).
54. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (2017).
55. See Nairon, 242 Ga. App. at 260, 529 S.E.2d at 391-92.
56. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2017).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Compare Braun, supra note 14, at 991-92 (discussing similar SLAPP-back claim
mechanisms under California law).
60. Harrison & Ferrin, supra note 18, at 5.
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dismissal.61 Some states have enacted narrow anti-SLAPP statutes only
applicable in certain circumstances, and other states have enacted
sweeping legislation that protects First Amendment activities related to
issues of public concern. 62 As of the publication of this Article, twentynine states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes.68
The problem with many anti-SLAPP statutes, however, is that they
directly infringe on the rights of the plaintiff in attempting to protect the
rights of the defendant. 64 As one commentator noted, "[t]he main
challenge state legislatures face in drafting an anti-SLAPP statute is
that in protecting one party's right to petition, an anti-SLAPP law can
directly infringe on the petitioning rights of the opposing party." 65
II. GEORGIA'S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE-O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1
Like other states, Georgia's legislature has attempted to fend off
SLAPP suits through legislation.66 Georgia first enacted its anti-SLAPP

61. Id.; see also Shannon Hartzler, Protecting Informed Public Participation:AntiSLAPP Law and the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2007) ("Common
features of anti-SLAPP laws include a mechanism for early procedural review and a
mandatory award of attorney's fees for a party whose motion to dismiss under the statute
is successful.").
62. See Hartzler, supra note 61, at 1243 ("Some states have decided to draft broad antiSLAPP laws and have left it to the courts to limit their reach through narrow
interpretations of the statutes, while others have chosen to word their anti-SLAPP
provisions narrowly to apply only to select situations."); see also Braun, supra note 14, at
1036-45 (comparing different states' anti-SLAPP laws); Harrison & Ferrin, supranote 18,
at 5-7 (providing specific examples of states with narrow statutes and states with broad
statutes); Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP Trap: Washington State's Enhanced
Statutory Protection for Targets of "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation",38
GONZ. L. REV. 263, 276-80 (2002-2003) (comparing different states' anti-SLAPP laws);
Jeremy Rosen & Felix Shafir, Helping Americans To Speak Freely, 18 FEDERALIST Soc'Y
REV. 22, 28-30 (2017) (comparing California's broad anti-SLAPP statute to New York's
more narrow statute).
63. Those states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. PUB. PARTICIPATION
PROJECT, supra note 3.
The following states have not enacted anti-SLAPP legislation: Alabama, Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
64. See discussion infra Part III.
65. Hartzler, supra note 61, at 1243.
66. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1.
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statute in 1996.67 The original statute protected only such speech made
"in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law."68 "In essence, the statute narrowed protected speech
to statements made in connection with official government proceedings.
When a person spoke on an issue not currently under consideration or
review through an official proceeding, no anti-SLAPP protections
applied."69

In 2016, the Georgia legislature expanded the scope of Georgia's
statutory anti-SLAPP protections to all speech about an issue of public
concern, notwithstanding the existence of an official government
proceeding. 70
A. Statutory Framework
1. Elements of an Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike
If a defendant believes she is the subject of a SLAPP, she can
immediately file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Georgia's anti-SLAPP
statute. Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute states the following:
A claim for relief against a person or entity arisingfrom any act of such
person or entity which could reasonably be construed as an act in
furtherance of the person's or entity's right of petition or free speech

under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the
State of Georgia in connection with an issue of public interest or

concern shall be subject to a motion to strike unless the court
determines that the nonmoving party has established that there is a
probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim.71

67. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 1996 Ga. Laws 260.
68. Former O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c) (2016) (emphasis added), amended by Ga. H.R. Bill
513, Reg. Sess., 2016 Ga. Laws 341.
69. Pierre-Joseph Noebes & Rachael Reed, Civil Practice:Pleadings and Motions, 33
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 112 (2016). See, e.g., Ga. Cmty. Support & Solutions, Inc. v. Berryhill,
275 Ga. App. 189, 192, 620 S.E.2d 178, 181 (2005).
70. Ga. H.R. Bill 513. See also Noebes & Reed, supra note 69, at 119 ('These additions
effectively extend anti-SLAPP protection to any speech or conduct connected to issues of
public concern, regardless of whether those issues are the subject of a government
proceeding.").
71. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1) (2017) (emphasis added). The Georgia legislature
amended Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, effective July 1, 2016. The amendments also
removed a condition in the old statute that required the plaintiff to sign and file a
verification with its complaint stating that the complaint was not a SLAPP suit. See Ga.
H.R. Bill 513; see also Noebes & Reed, supra note 69, at 109 (discussing 2016 amendments
to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1).
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Thus, there are two basic elements to Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute:
First, the filer's claims must "aris[e]from" the defendant exercising his
constitutional right of free speech or to petition the government. 72
Second, the purported exercise of free speech or to petition the
government must be "in connection with an issue of public interest or
concern."73 If these elements are met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party (the alleged SLAPP filer) to establish a probability of success on
the merits of its claim. 74
2. Procedure After Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is Filed
When a defendant files a motion to strike under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1,
the entire case is immediately stayed: "All discovery and any pending
hearings or motions in the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a
motion to dismiss or a motion to strike made pursuant to subsection (b)
of this Code section until a final decision on the motion."75 The court must
then rule on the motion to strike "not more than 30 days after service
unless the emergency matters before the court require a later hearing." 76
In ruling on the motion, "the court shall consider the pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based."77 However, "on noticed motion and for good
cause shown, [the court] may order that specified discovery or other
hearings or motions be conducted notwithstanding [the automatic
stay]."7 8 Thus, the court has discretion to permit discovery, but it is not

obligated to do so.
3. Prevailing Party's Right to Attorney's Fees
The cost-shifting provision in Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute strongly
favors defendants. "[A] prevailing moving party on a motion to strike

72. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. Notably, if the nonmoving party successfully shows a probability of success and
defeats a motion to strike made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1), "neither that
determination nor the fact of such determination shall be admissible in evidence at any
later stage of the case or in any subsequent action and no burden of proof or degree of proof
otherwise applicable shall be affected by such determination in any later stage of the case
or in any subsequent proceeding." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(3) (2017).
75. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d) (2017).
76. Id.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2) (2017). However, if the nonmoving party is a public
figure plaintiff, "then the nonmoving party shall be entitled to discovery on the sole issue
of actual malice whenever actual malice is relevant to the court's determination under
[O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1)]." Id.
78. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d).
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[under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1)] shall be granted the recovery of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation related to the action."79 On the
other hand, a prevailing nonmoving party is only entitled to fees if it
shows that the motion to strike "is frivolous or is solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay."80
4. Summary of Georgia's Anti-SLAPP Statute
In sum, Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute operates as follows:
eThe plaintiff files a claim against a defendant;
*If the defendant believes the plaintiffs claims arise out of the
defendant's rights to free speech or petition about an issue of public
concern, the defendant may move to strike the plaintiffs complaint;81
*Once the defendant files its motion to strike, the entire case is
stayed; 82
*The burden then shifts to the plaintiffto prove either (i) the plaintiffs
claims do not implicate the anti-SLAPP statute, or (ii) a probability of
success on the merits of the plaintiffs claims; 83
*The court must rule on the motion to strike within thirty days,
considering the pleadings and opposing affidavits (that is, weighing
disputed facts, without providing the plaintiff the benefit of any discovery
or a jury trial); 84
*If the plaintiff cannot prove a probability of success, its claims are
dismissed and it must pay the defendant's attorney's fees. 8 5

B. Application of Georgia'sAnti-SLAPP Statute in Federal Court
One issue several federal courts around the country have faced is
whether state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal court.86 The issue
boils down to whether a federal court that has jurisdiction based on
diversity should apply state law or federal law. "More specifically, can a
federal court invoke the state-level anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss
(special motion), or is the special motion trumped by a Federal Rule of

79. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b.1) (2017) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).
82. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d).
83. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).
84. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2).
85. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1(b)(1), (b.1).
86. Many scholars and practitioners have argued for a federal anti-SLAPP law. Such a
topic presents an article in and of itself. See Rosen & Shafir, supranote 62, at 28-30.
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Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim?"87

In a recent decision, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia ruled that Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply because it is a procedural rule conflicting with the pleading
standard set forth in Rule 12 of the FRCP.8 8 In her order, Judge Orinda

Evans acknowledged the circuit split on the issue, noting that the United
States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have
held that anti-SLAPP statutes do apply in federal court, while the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded otherwise.89 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will likely weigh in soon, as the
defendant appealed Judge Evan's ruling.90 The Eleventh Circuit's
impending ruling has significant implications. If state anti-SLAPP
statutes do not apply in federal court in the Eleventh Circuit, then
plaintiffs are free to file SLAPP suits in such federal courts (assuming
they can obtain jurisdiction) without facing the consequences imposed by
a state's anti-SLAPP statute.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF GEORGIA'S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE

While Georgia lawmakers may have passed O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 with
a good-faith intent to protect the rights of citizens who wish to speak out
on matters of public concern, 9 ' the legislature may have gone too far.
Although the statute promotes the constitutional rights of one group of
people (the right to free speech and petition of people speaking out on
public issues), it does so by infringing on the constitutional rights of
another group (those who wish to file a lawsuit and exercise their own
constitutional rights to petition and to have a jury decide the merits of
their claims). The Supreme Court of Washington summed up this
constitutional infirmity well, stating that anti-SLAPP statutes "seek[] to
protect one group of citizens' constitutional rights of expression and
87. Katelyn E. Saner, Getting SLAPP-ED in Federal Court: Applying State AntiSLAPP Special Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 63 DUKE L.J. 781,
783 (2013) (analyzing the issue in detail and arguing that state anti-SLAPP procedures
should apply in federal court).
88. Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., Case No. 1:16-cv-01720-ODE (N.D. Ga. Feb.
15, 2017) (order denying defendant's motion to strike).
89. Compare Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); Henry v. Lake Charles
Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999), with Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
90. Notice of Appeal, Carbone, Case No. 1:16-cv-01720-ODE (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2017).
91. See Noebes & Reed, supra note 69 (quoting legislative findings and intent of

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1).
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petition by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition
and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." 92
Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute establishes a unique procedure 93
requiring the trial court, when presented with a motion to strike a
complaint, to consider the pleadings, weigh the evidence, and decide
whether the plaintiff has established (that is, proven) a probability that
it will prevail on its claim. 94 The plaintiff is not entitled to discovery when
opposing the motion to strike. 95 The plaintiff also is not allowed to have
a jury decide the merits of its claim. 96 This procedure is distinct from the
procedure for addressing a motion to dismiss, which requires the court to
assume the facts pled in the complaint are true and then determine
whether those facts plausibly state a cause of action.9 7 The procedure in
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 is also unlike the procedure for addressing motions
for summary judgment, which allows the nonmoving party to take
discovery and requires the case to proceed unless the moving party can
prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists for a jury to consider.98
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, even if there is a disputed issue of fact, the
case will not proceed if the judge concludes that the nonmoving party did
not satisfy the heightened probability showing. 99
In short, a plaintiff may have its case dismissed under the anti-SLAPP
statute despite (i) complying with well-established rules of pleading that
require only a short and plain statement of the claims showing the
plaintiff is entitled to relief, (ii) taking no discovery, and (iii) establishing

92. Davis, 351 P.3d at 875.
93. See supraPart H.
94. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1(b), (d).
95. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d) (giving the trial court the power to permit discovery,
but not requiring that discovery be allowed).
96. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-11.1(b).
97. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) (2017); Blockbuster Inv'rs LP v. Cox Enters., Inc., 314
Ga. App. 506, 506, 724 S.E.2d 813, 814 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) ("A motion to dismiss should be granted only where a complaint shows with
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could
be proven in support of his claim. We thus construe all the allegations in the complaint in
a light most favorable to the complaining party and resolve all doubts in his favor."). The
complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claims showing the plaintiff
is entitled to relief. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A) (2017).
98. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f) (2017) (emphasis added); Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,
491, 405 S.E.2d 474, 475 (1991).
99. Probability is the "quality, state, or condition of being more likely ...
to have
happened than not; the character of a proposition or supposition that is more likely true
than false." BIACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Notably, this "probability" standard
is a higher burden than the preponderance of the evidence standard that plaintiff would
face at trial.
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a disputed issue of fact on the face of the pleadings and any affidavits
submitted in connection with the motion to strike.100 This very real
scenario raises serious constitutional concerns.
A. Georgia'sAnti-SLAPP Statute Infringes on a Plaintiffs Right to a
Jury Trial Guaranteedby the Georgia Constitution'0 1
1. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 Undermines the Jury's Fact-Finding
Function
The Georgia Constitution protects the right to a jury trial for civil
litigants in Georgia courts. 102 Any statute undermining the jury's basic
function to resolve factual disputes violates this right.10s Georgia's antiSLAPP statute is likely unconstitutional for this reason.
The Georgia statute usurps the jury's role by tasking the trial court
judge with weighing evidence and making a factual determination about
whether the nonmoving party has proven a probability that it will
prevail. 104 Moreover, the statute requires the trial judge make this
factual determination without ensuring that the nonmoving party has an
opportunity to take discovery.. 105 Courts in three states-two of which are
the highest court in their respective states-have ruled that anti-SLAPP

100. See, e.g., Hindu Temple & Cmty. Ctr. v. Raghunathan, 311 Ga. App. 109, 109, 714
S.E.2d 628, 629 (2011) (striking well-pled complaint under anti-SLAPP statute).
101. In suits for which a jury trial was available at common law, the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution preserves that right for civil actions in which
the amount in controversy exceeds $20. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. But the Seventh
Amendment has never been applied to the states, so state courts are not bound by the
United States Constitution to offer jury trials in civil cases. See City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 719 (1999) (holding the Seventh Amendment
does not apply to the states); Gasperiniv. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996)
(holding the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states). This Article leaves for
another day discussion of the possibility that the Seventh Amendment would be violated if
a motion to strike a claim under the anti-SLAPP statute was granted in federal court. In
short, there are strong arguments that Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute would infringe on the
Seventh Amendment for the reasons argued herein.
102. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11 ("The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate").
103. See, e.g., Atlanta Oculoplastic Surg., P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 735, 691
S.E.2d 218, 223 (2010) (holding statute capping noneconomic damages was
unconstitutional because it "nullifie[d] the jury's findings of fact regarding damages and
thereby undermine[d] the jury's basic function").
104. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-11.1(b).
105. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d). In fact, discovery is automatically stayed upon the
filing of a motion to strike, though the trial court has discretion to permit specified
discovery. Id.

424

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

statutes similar to Georgia's statute are unconstitutional on these
grounds.106
Most recently, in Mobile Diagnostic Imaging v. Hooten, 07 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that "[t]he procedural provisions of
[Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute] deprive the non-moving party of the
right to a jury trial by requiring a court to make pretrial factual findings
to determine whether the moving party is immune from liability. The
statute, therefore, is unconstitutional." 108
Similarly, in 2015, the Washington Supreme Court also held in Davis
v. Cox'0o that Washington's anti-SLAPP statute "violate[d] the right of
trial by jury under [Washington's state constitution] because it requires
a trial judge to invade the jury's province of resolving disputed facts and
dismiss-and punish-nonfrivolous claims without a trial."110
Although Davis and Mobile Diagnostic Imaging are relatively recent
decisions, protecting the right to jury trial against encroachment by wellintended anti-SLAPP legislation is not new. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court recognized the problem in 1994, holding in Opinionof the
Justices11 ' that a proposed anti-SLAPP statute-identical in all material
respects to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1-was unconstitutional. 112 The proposed
New Hampshire statute provided that a plaintiffs complaint was subject
to a motion to strike "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim."113 Like the Georgia statute, the New Hampshire legislation
did not elaborate on the meaning of "probability," but the court
interpreted it to mean that a plaintiff capable of showing only a
possibility of prevailing would be subject to a motion to strike.1 14 Also like
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, the New Hampshire legislation required the court
to consider and weigh disputed evidence when determining whether a
plaintiff met its burden of establishing a "probability that [the plaintiff]

106. See, e.g., Davis, 351 P.3d at 873 (holding Washington's anti-SLAPP statute, which
required a plaintiff to prove "by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing
[on the claim]," violated state constitutional right to jury trial); Op. of the Justices, 641 A.2d
at 1015 (holding New Hampshire's proposed anti-SLAPP statute would violate state
constitutional right to jury trial); Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 889 N.W.2d at 35 (holding
Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute violated state right to jury trial).
107. 889 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. App. 2016).
108. Id. at 35.
109. 351 P.3d at 862 (Wash. 2015).
110. Id. at 875.
111. 641 A.2d 1012 (N.H. 1994).
112. Id. at 1015.
113. Id. at 1013.
114. Id. at 1014-15.
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unconstitutional, the court explained that "[a] solution cannot strengthen
the constitutional rights of one group of citizens by infringing upon the
116
rights of another group."

The procedural requirements of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute
similarly infringe on a plaintiffs constitutional right to a jury trial. The
Georgia statute requires the trial court to weigh disputed evidence, make
factual determinations, and ultimately dismiss claims unless "the
nonmoving party has established that there is a probability that the
nonmoving party will prevail on the claim." 117 This places an
unconstitutional burden on a plaintiff to prove a "probability" of
prevailing without their claims ever being presented to a jury. Like
Washington's invalidated statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 "creates a
truncated adjudication of the merits of a plaintiffs claim, including
nonfrivolous factual issues, without a trial. Such a procedure invades the
jury's essential role of deciding debatable questions of fact."118
2. Georgia's Legislature Expressly Rejected a Summary
Judgment Standard for O.C.GA. § 9-11-11.1
The grant of summary judgment-when a court decides that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as
9
a matter of law 11 -provides
a constitutionally valid exception to a party's
right to have a jury decide its case. Accordingly, some courts faced with
constitutional challenges to their state's anti-SLAPP statute have
creatively "interpreted" their state's anti-SLAPP statute as imposing a
summary judgment standard. 120
For example, the District of Columbia adopted an anti-SLAPP statute
substantially similar to Georgia's statute. 121 That statute requires that a
party opposing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike must demonstrate that
its claim is "likely to succeed on the merits." 122 The District of Columbia

115. Id. (explaining that "the trial court that hears the special motion to strike is
required to weigh the pleadings and affidavits on both sides and adjudicate a factual
dispute").
116. Id. at 1015.
117. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b).
118. Davis, 351 P.3d at 874; see also Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, 889 N.W.2d at 33
(invalidating Minnesota anti-SLAPP statute because "a court is required to ignore genuine
issues of material fact and to step into the jury's role of deciding disputed facts and weighing
evidence").
119. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(f); Lau's Corp., 261 Ga. at 491.
120. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1237 (D.C. App. 2016).
121. See D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2017).
122. See D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2017).
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Court of Appeals stated that this statutory language literally mandated
evidentiary proof of success and did not permit mere reliance on
allegations in the complaint. 123 The court also equated the term "likely"
with "probable," meaning that the nonmovant had to show that it would
probably prevail. 124
In light of the statute's evidentiary burden, the court ruled on the
constitutional conflict: "An interpretation that puts the court in the
position of making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence
to determine whether a case should proceed to trial raises serious
constitutional concerns because it encroaches on the role of the jury." 125
Rather than calling it how it saw it, however, the court decided to invoke
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and interpret the statute as if it
imposed a summary judgment standard. 126 In effect, the court ruled that
the District of Columbia legislature did not mean what it said.127 The
court plainly recognized that it was walking (or crossing) the line
demarcating its role in our system of government to interpret and apply
statutes, not rewrite them, explaining "[w]e acknowledge that our
functional interpretation of the statutory language is not evident from
the face of the statute alone. As we have explained, the interpretation we
adopt is made possible by the ambiguity of the statutory language and
rendered necessary to avoid doubt about the constitutionality of

§

16-5502(b)."128

Whether it is prudent for courts to "interpret," or rewrite, statutes in
order to avoid a constitutional conflict is up for debate. 129
Notwithstanding such a debate, however, it would be wrong for any court
to graft a summary judgment standard onto Georgia's anti-SLAPP
statute because the Georgia legislature expressly rejected a summary
judgment standard during the enactment process.
A version of the anti-SLAPP statute proposed in the Georgia House
provided that a complaint "shall be subject to a motion to strike [under
the anti-SLAPP statute] unless the court determines that the nonmoving
party has established that he or she would be likely to prevail on a motion
123. Competitive Enter. Inst., 150 A.3d at 1233.
124. Id. at 1233-34; see also Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333-34 (recognizing that the District
of Columbia's anti-SLAPP statute imposed a burden beyond that necessary to overcome
summary judgment but ruling that the statute did not apply in federal court).
125. Competitive Enter. Inst., 150 A.3d at 1235.
126. Id. at 1236.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1237.
129. See Davis, 351 P.3d at 867 (stating that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
should be applied to save a statute when it is "genuinely susceptible to two constructions,"
but noting that was not the case with Washington's anti-SLAPP statute).
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for summary judgment brought by the moving party." 30 That version,
however, was rejected in favor of the "probability of prevailing" standard
in the current law. 131 Thus, the Georgia legislature intended to impose a
heightened standard different than that of summary judgment. It would
be especially surprising, then, for a court to interpret Georgia's statute
as providing a summary judgment standard when both the statutory
language and legislative history make clear that summary judgment was
not the standard the legislature intended.
B. Georgia'sAnti-SLAPP Statute Infringes on a Plaintiffs Right to
Petition the Courts
In addition to the right to a jury trial, Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute
also runs afoul of other constitutional protections. Ironically, although
attempting to protect the right to petition, the Georgia statute may in
fact violate that same constitutional protection.
As noted earlier, 132 the First Amendment guarantees the right to
"petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 1 33 The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that "the right of access to the courts
is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances." 1 34 Under the First Amendment, a lawsuit may not
be prohibited, notwithstanding the intent or purpose of the lawsuit,
unless it is a "mere sham." 1 35 Moreover, the Supreme Court explained
that "if there is a genuine issue of material fact that turns on the
credibility of witnesses or on the proper inferences to be drawn from
undisputed facts, it cannot, in our view, be concluded that the suit should
be enjoined." 136 The Supreme Court of Washington in Davis relied on this
application of the First Amendment right to petition when invalidating
Washington's anti-SLAPP statute.1 37
By establishing a high burden of proof in a purported SLAPP suit
while simultaneously requiring a court to dismiss a case turning on
130. Ga. H. Bill 513, Reg. Sess. (2015) (as introduced).
131. Compare id. with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1).
132. See supraPart III.
133. U.S. CONST. amend I.; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 9 ("The people have the
right to assemble peaceably for their common good and to apply by petition or remonstrance
to those vested with the powers of government for redress of grievances.").
134. Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. at 741 ("The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be
enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the
plaintiffs desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the
Act.").
136. Id. at 745.
137. See Davis, 351 P.3d at 872.
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genuine issues of disputed fact and competing witnesses, Georgia's antiSLAPP statute impedes a party's right to petition and access the court
under the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Georgia's antiSLAPP statute is thus subject to constitutional attack on this ground as
well.
C. Georgia's Anti-SLAPP Statute May Also Violate a Plaintiffs Rights to
Due Process and Equal Protection under the Georgia and United
States Constitutions
1. Due Process
Although less blatant than the constitutional problems noted above,
Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute may also run afoul of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clause provisions of the Georgia and United States
Constitutions. Plaintiffs are guaranteed the right to due process under
both the Georgia and United States Constitutions.138 "The
constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of law is, at its core, the
right to notice and the opportunity to be heard."139 Due process is satisfied
"if a party has reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, and to
present its claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the
proceeding and the character of the rights which may be affected by it."140
The truncated adjudication of a plaintiffs claims provided for by
Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute pushes the limit of due process
requirements.
Under the statute, a plaintiffs claims are subject to final adjudication
in a short-not more than 30 days-period, and the party is not
guaranteed a right to discover evidence to present in support of its claims,
which the party must prove by a "probability" standard that is higher
than the burden of proof at trial. 141 The statute's failure to provide for
discovery is especially problematic because the trial judge is required to
138. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. 1 ("No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law."); see also
Cherokee Cty. v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 255 Ga. App. 764, 767 n.1, 566
S.E.2d 470, 473 n.1 (2002) (explaining that the state and federal due process guarantees
are substantively identical).
139. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Baker, 271 Ga. 35, 37, 518 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1999) (emphasis
added).
140. Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also,
e.g., State v. Johnson, 261 Ga. 363, 363, 404 S.E.2d 563, 564 (1991) (holding that Georgia's
surety remission statutes violated the right to due process under state and federal
constitutions "to the extent they require[d] the surety to pay the judgment in full before
being permitted to present arguments in support of remission").
141. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1(b), (d).
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assess whether a party meets the heightened probability standard even
when there are disputed issues of material fact. At best, the Georgia
statute allows a party the opportunity to argue that it meets the
heightened probability standard without the benefit of full discovery
provided for under the Georgia Civil Practice Act. At worst, the statute's
procedures are an "empty ritual." 142 A Georgia court could easily conclude
that this is not the type of proceeding and opportunity to be heard
contemplated by the due process clauses in the Georgia and United
States Constitutions.143
2. Equal Protection
Both the Georgia and United States Constitutions guarantee the right
to equal protection under the law. 144 The Equal Protection Clause
"requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions."14 5 It can be argued that Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute
affords higher protection of the defendant's constitutional rights than it
does the plaintiffs constitutional rights under like circumstances and
conditions, namely, in the same case before the same court. The statute
limits plaintiffs' rights to petition the court, while at the same time
preserving (and strengthening) the defendants' right to petition. 146 This
disparity is highlighted by the treatment that movants (defendants) and
nonmovants (plaintiffs) receive under the statute with regard to (i)
decisions on the merits and (ii) the right to attorneys' fees and costs-(i)
if the trial court grants a motion to strike, the decision is case dispositive,
but a decision in favor of a nonmovant is inadmissible for any purpose;
(ii) if the movant prevails, she is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, but
142. Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 890, 427 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1993) (explaining that a
presumption that cannot be rebutted is inconsistent with due process).
143. Such a decision may turn on the trial court's application of the statute in individual
cases, such as the extent to which discovery is permitted and evidence is allowed to be
presented and heard at the hearing.
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall. . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2 ("No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws."); see also Lewis v. Chatham Cty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 298 Ga. 73, 74 n.1, 779 S.E.2d 371, 372 n.1 (2015) ("The Georgia clause is
generally coextensive with and substantially equivalent to the federal equal protection
clause, and we apply them as one.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
145. Dorsey v. City of Atlanta, 216 Ga. 778, 781, 119 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1961).
146. Cf. Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566, 571, 322 S.E.2d 487, 492 (1984).
Because the rights of children whose mothers have been wrongfully killed are
protected by O.C.G.A. § 51-4-3 in ways in which the right of children whose
fathers have been wrongfully killed are not protected, we find that O.C.G.A.
§ 51-4-2 deprives children of deceased fathers who leave widows of equal
protection of law in violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II of our Constitution.
Id.
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if the nonmovant prevails it is entitled to fees and costs only under
certain conditions.1 47
Despite such disparity, Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute should be
upheld on equal protection grounds if it is rationally related to promoting
some legitimate government interest.14 8 There are certainly legitimate
government interests at stake, specifically, the exercise of free speech
and right to petition the government. Less clear, however, is whether the
anti-SLAPP statute is rationally related to those interests. California
courts have ruled a rational relationship exists; 149 Georgia courts have
not yet weighed in on the matter.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED APPROACH

Georgia's current anti-SLAPP statute creates as many constitutional
problems as the legislature sought to protect when enacting the statute.
If the constitutionality of the statute is ever considered, there are strong
grounds to invalidate it. It remains to be seen whether the Georgia
legislature will take a proactive approach and amend the statute to cure
the constitutional infirmities.
The best long-term solution to SLAPP suits, however, may not be
through legislative action but rather through a combination of judicial
remedies.1 50 Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts are
empowered to dismiss lawsuits that are based on constitutionally
protected activity. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been used for
decades to end suits based on constitutionally protected conduct
(including SLAPPs) at the motion to dismiss stage, just like Georgia's
anti-SLAPP statute attempts to do. In addition, there are statutory
provisions in Georgia's code that SLAPP targets can use to fight back,
specifically O.C.G.A. § 51-7-8 (abusive litigation claim for damages) and
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-14, 13-6-11 (providing for attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation). Each of these statutory provisions provides an effective
mechanism to combat the costs of a SLAPP suit, as well as seek damages
for abusive litigation-and they have been used successfully in Georgia
by SLAPP targets.

147. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1(b)(3), (b.1).
148. Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 418, 434 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1993) ("[S]tatutory
classifications are presumed valid and will survive an equal protection challenge if the
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.").
149. See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996); Bernardo v.
Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Lafayette Morehouse,
Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
150. See discussion at supra Part I.
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In sum, Georgia's abusive litigation and attorney's fees statutes,
coupled with a properly filed motion to dismiss by the target of the
SLAPP, provide an adequate and constitutional method to fend off
SLAPP suits while at the same time providing the target of the SLAPP
with damages, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation resulting from the
SLAPP suit. In cases in which courts believe that the plaintiff has filed a
true SLAPP suit, the court should apply the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine
at the motion to dismiss stage and also liberally apply the abusive
litigation and fee shifting statutes in the Georgia code.

432

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

